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THE EVOLUTION OF RACE IN THE LAW: THE SUPREME
COURT MOVES FROM APPROVING INTERNMENT OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS TO DISAPPROVING
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS
Reggie Oh*
Frank Wu**
INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has
articulated the constitutional standards for the governmental use of
racial classifications by referring repeatedly to its wartime decisions
on the Japanese American internment. Those decisions were understood then as being emphatically not about race, but have been
understood since as being equally emphatically based upon acquiescence to racism. In the past year, with the most recent race cases
that have been handed down by the Court, especially its affirmative
action decision, the doctrines that have given substance to the constitutional guarantee of equal protection have become increasingly
problematic. The awkward development of the doctrines can be
traced to their origins.
During World War II, the Supreme Court decided the historic
case of Korematsu v. United States.1 There, the Court approved the
internment of Japanese Americans as a racial group without individual determinations of political loyalty. The case is one of the
"justly infamous episode[s]" in the history of the American judiciary, according to Professor Laurence Tribe.2 It remains the best
known constitutional challenge brought by Asian Americans as well
as the most important source of the standard known as "strict
*
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1. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), conviction vacated on writ of coram nobis, 584 F. Supp. 1406
(N.D. Cal. 1984).
2. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-14, at 1466 (2d ed.

1988).
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scrutiny," which marks the constitutional limits of the public use of

racial classifications and private use of racial generalizations.
In its 1994-1995 Term, the Supreme Court decided the similarly
significant case of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.3 There, the
Court effectively disapproved of affirmative action for African
Americans and other racial minorities as strongly as it would of
racism against these groups.4 The Adarand opinion affects not only
so-called "reverse discrimination" but also conventional discrimination. It applies "strict scrutiny" to all racial references in the
law, regardless of the underlying intent, impact, or context.
As the Court suggests, the Korematsu precedent is crucial to the
Adarand decision.5 In Adarand, the Court analyzes Korematsu in
depth, acknowledging that its own judgment had been mistaken in
the internment cases, instead of simply citing the decisions as it
formally had done until the very recent past.6 The Court never-

theless fails to appreciate the differences between Korematsu and
Adarand, and in particular the consequences of using "strict
scrutiny" for all racial classifications. This essay explores the
complex relation-ship between Korematsu and Adarand, and offers a
critique of the reasoning used in both cases. The essay argues that
Adarand may permit invidious racial classifications to survive
constitutional challenge and that its analysis of the standing issues
associated with collateral litigation over affirmative action are
inconsistent with its resolution of substantive issues of racial
discrimination.
KOREMATSU v. UNITED STATES

The litigation brought by Fred Korematsu, a native-born
American citizen, was one in a trilogy of cases decided by the7
Supreme Court concerning the Japanese American internment.

3. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
4. The popular perception of affirmative action presents African Americans as the
exclusive or primary beneficiaries. In Adarand, the affirmative action program at issue,
unlike many other plans, included Asian Americans among its beneficiaries. Id. at
2103.
The status of gender discrimination and gender affirmative action remains
somewhat unclear. Observers have noted, however, that White women are the largest
beneficiary group under affirmative action. See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS:
BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 136-37 (2d ed. 1995).

5. See infra notes 60-105 and accompanying text.
6. 115 S. Ct. at 2106, 2117.
7. The two others were Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and Yasui
v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943). There was a fourth case near the end of the war,
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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Writing for six of the nine members of the high court, Justice Hugo
Black held that it was constitutional to imprison all personsincluding United States citizens-of Japanese ancestry because they
could be considered enemy aliens. The many ironies of the
Korematsu case have been recognized by the Asian American and
legal communities, but they have not necessarily been respected by
the Court.9
To this day, the significance of the case shows its contradictions. For Asian Americans, Korematsu still stands as a reminder
that they are viewed as outsiders and foreigners and a potential
threat to their own community. 1° For Asian Americans, consequently, Korematsu evokes memories of prejudice, shame, and
hardship. Simultaneously, Korematsu remains controlling case law,
establishing the related rules that racial classifications are suspect
and subject to "strict scrutiny" by the judicial system, although they
are not necessarily unconstitutional as a result. Thus, for civil rights
lawyers and litigants, Korematsu has been invoked to prevent the
invidious use of race.
The contradictions of the case were created by the divergence
between its reasoning and its result. On the one hand, the Court
affixes its imprimatur to the mistreatment of a racial group while, on
the other hand, warns against the use of race as the basis for any
official action. In addition to approving the internment as necessary,
the majority opinion sets forth three principles: (1) "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect," (2) "courts must subject them to the most

8. 323 U.S. at 223. Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson dissented, each filing a
separate opinion.
9. But see Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric:Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1379 (1995) (stating that "[certain Supreme Court
rulings are so distasteful to some lower court judges that they will ask for their
excision in a colleague's opinion if there is another more acceptable precedent for the
same general proposition") (citing Korematsu as an example).
10. At the outset, it is important to note that the internment affected Japanese
Americans and Japanese foreign nationals, not other Asian Americans and Asian
foreign nationals, although some vigilante action failed to distinguish along ethnic
lines. Moreover, some Chinese Americans and Korean Americans were
unsympathetic at the time toward Japanese Americans; indeed, their reaction may
have been attributed to a tendency to view Japanese Americans and Japanese
immigrants as representative of the Japanese Empire, which had subjugated other
Asian nations. Cf. generally YEN LE ESPIRITU, ASIAN AMERICAN PANET-NICITY (1992)
(analyzing tensions within the Asian American movement).
This Article purposefully suppresses the distinction between race and ethnicity,
to the extent that it is observed either in law or in fact. Suffice it to say that the
conception of race and ethnicity (and nationality) in operation during the Korematsu
era treated "Japanese" and "Japanese American" as racial categories, roughly
analogous to the understanding of "Asian" and "Asian American" today.
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rigid scrutiny," and (3) "[t]hat is not to say that all such restrictions
are unconstitutional."1 1 These statements may have been dicta, but
they have assumed greater legal significance than any other aspect
of the case. Taken together, they have become embedded in the law
as the "strict scrutiny" standard of review for racial classifications.
The first two propositions establish that any legislation or other
government action which uses a racial classification is to be viewed
as presumptively illegitimate if challenged in litigation. In contrast,
almost all legislation and other government action without a racial
classification are understood as presumptively legitimate, even if
they distinguish among classes of citizens to the disadvantage of
some.1 In practical terms, the government bears the burden of proof
in justifying an explicit racial classification, but the individual who
wishes to challenge the statute does so in every other context. The
Court has since varied slightly in its phrasing of the "strict scrutiny"
test, but the basic elements of the test remain the same: the government must show that the law serves a "compelling interest" and,
moreover, that it is "narrowly tailored" to further that interest."
The third proposition is a caveat. It emphasizes that despite the
difficulty of justifying racial preferences in the law, the government
may prevail in some special cases. Over time, this difficulty has
proved absolutely impossible to overcome. Korernatsu remains the
only case of a racial classification, concededly not "benign," that has
been subjected to and has survived "strict scrutiny." As Professor
Gerald Gunther famously observed, the standard has been "'strict'
in theory and fatal in fact."1
In Korematsu, the majority rested its decision on a pair of distinct rationales. Whatever the persuasiveness of these rationales at
the time, they have been seriously challenged since. Neither the
Court nor commentators have been heard defending these rationales
for the decision in at least a generation.15

11. 323 U.S. at 216.
12. For example, discrimination as between ophthalmologists and optometrists on
the one hand, and opticians on the other hand, is subject to a deferential standard of
rationality review. Under this standard, the Court must conclude that the
discrimination is irrational in order to strike it down. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483,487-88 (1955).
13. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
14. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrineon a ChangingCourt: A Model for Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978) (joint
separate opinion)) (quoting Gunther, supra).
15. However, Justice Douglas, who had voted with the majority in Korematsu at the
beginning of his career, believed the decision was correct through the end of his
tenure on the bench. See infra note 72.
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First, the Court reasoned that as an institution it was required to
defer to the judgment of the military, especially due to the exigencies
of war. The Court wrote:
[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military
authorities and of Congress... [and w]e cannot say that the
war-making branches of the Government did not have
ground[s] for believing that in a critical hour such persons
could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and
constituted a menace to the national defense and safety .... 16
Second, the Court responded to the constitutional challenge by
stating that the case had nothing to do with race, much less racism.
The Court wrote, "Korematsu was not excluded from the Military
Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded
because we are at war with the Japanese Empire .
,," The Court
blended the justification of military necessity with its denial of racial
prejudice: "To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without
reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely
confuses the issue."'18
Both of these lines of reasoning have been weakened over time.
The factual basis of the former has been undermined while the
internal inconsistencies of the latter have proven too difficult to
dismiss. The justification of national security has often been raised
in many contexts, but has rarely been relied upon by the Court. 9 As
documented by a scholar associated with the later successful petition for vacatur of Korematsu's conviction, the Department of
Justice knowingly misrepresented the risk of disloyalty on the part
of Japanese Americans. Professor Peter Irons has shown in his
exhaustive study that the Department of Justice, along with the
military, had concluded internally that there was no significant risk
of disloyal acts being committed by Japanese Americans.
Given the Court's extensive references to racial classifications,
the majority's assertion that Korematsu was not about race seems

16. 323 U.S. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943)).

17. Id. at 223.
18. Id.
19. The Court has continued to accept the military necessity justification in contexts
other than race. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (finding that a
military ban on the wearing of yarmulkes does not violate the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom to exercise one's religious beliefs).
20. PETER H. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 268-77 (1983). Cf. JOHN W. DOWER, WAR
WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR 79-83 (1986) (discussing
racialization of war in the Pacific theater, compared to the Atlantic theater, analyzing
both United States and Japanese perspectives, with a short section on Japanese
Americans).
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incredible on its face. The lead counsel in the vacatur of the Korematsu conviction, Professor Lorraine Bannai and attorney Dale
Minami, argue that the majority opinion is incoherent. The Court
accepted the military explanation that the internment was necessary
because of some sort of racial affinity on the part of Japanese Americans to Japan-even as it denied that race was a factor in the
military decision making.21 Thus, the Court insisted that its decision
was not motivated by overt hostility toward Korematsu or his
Japanese American background. Still, it is difficult to deny that
Korematsu in particular and Japanese Americans as a group are
linked to the Japanese Empire by race. Absent race, Korematsu was
simply another United States citizen.
In marked contrast to the judicial disregard of the problems in
the Korematsudecision, the executive and legislative branches slowly
came to accept that the internment was guided by prejudice. Those
branches apologized symbolically and monetarily by providing
reparations in the 1970s and 1980s.
Notwithstanding the consensus that condemned the Korematsu
decision almost as soon as it had been issued, the principles enunciated in the majority opinion became established as fixtures of
constitutional law. The Korematsu case was transformed into an
obligatory citation, strangely warranting no more than cursory
discussion.
A survey of Supreme Court cases from 1945 to 1995 reveals that
Korematsu was cited as authority more than fifty times, but it was
discussed in depth only rarely. Typically, the reference was literally
a single sentence, so that it stood as legal authority barren of
substantive analysis.23

21. Lorraine K. Bannai & Dale Minami, Internment During World War II and

Litigations, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT 755, 774 (Hyung-chan Kim
ed., 1992) (discussing how the Korematsu Court "initially denie[d] any connection
between the exclusion [from a military area] and race, then state[d] the connection
between Korematsu and Japan but refuse[d] to discuss this as an issue").
22. See Proclamation No. 4417, 41 Fed. Reg. 7741 (1976) (quoting President Ford as
stating, "we now know what we should have know then-not only was that
evacuation wrong, but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans"); Civil
Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (1988). One may well ask why it remained
necessary to clarify that "Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans."
23. Among the cases citing Korematsu are: Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
589 n.16 (1952) (upholding immigration statutes and using Korematsu as an example of
presidential and congressional authority to which the Court would defer because of
the "war power over even citizens"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 661 n.3 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring) (citing Korematsu as an example of
exercise of presidential power with express congressional approval); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (citing Korematsu in striling down antimiscegenation
law); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 n.9 (1973) (plurality opinion)
(applying heightened scrutiny to gender discrimination and analogizing gender
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Strikingly, Korematsu was discussed in neutral terms as late as
1987, without any hint that the Court believed it to be wrongly
decided. Indeed, in the 1987 case concerning the internment, which
was resolved on jurisdictional grounds, the Court offered no comment on the internment itself.24
Surprisingly, Korematsu was not discussed at all in 1954, when
the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, unanimously declaring racial segregation in public education to be unconstitutional.2 5 As a historical matter, under the prevailing doctrine at
that time, the limitation of Korematsu on the federal government
should indicate that Korematsu is less, not more, of an equal
protection case. That surface distinction between applicability of
equal protection to the federal and state governments is at odds with
the analysis of congruence between federal and state levels offered
in Adarand.26 Some commentators have argued that Korematsu and
Brown present different analytical approaches for evaluating laws
based on race: Korematsu focuses on racial classifications being used
by the government, but Brown focuses on the fundamental rights
being infringed upon by the government. 27 The Court has not
discrimination to race discrimination).
Two earlier race cases involving Japanese Americans cited Korematsu in neutral
terms with implicit approval of its holding: Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 671
(1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (invalidating California Alien Land Laws); Takahashi
v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 413, 418, 423 (1948) (striking down California
law on issuance of fishing licenses, which had prevented aliens "ineligible to
citizenship" from obtaining them).
Korematsu, like many cases, has had a successful career in dissenting opinions.
Justice Thurgood Marshal], for example, cited it in a case where the majority refused
to apply heightened scrutiny to age discrimination and where the majority opinion
omitted any cite to Korematsu. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
24. See United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987) (holding that a claim for
compensation arising from the internment was not within the jurisdiction of the
regional court of appeals, but fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit).
25. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). Korematsu is cited in the companion case to Brown at
the federal level, Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 n.3 (1954), which is accepted as
being the case that brought the convergence of state and federal standards on racebased laws; see also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2107 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 191-92 (1964) (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216), to demonstrate that the Supreme
Court had understood the standards for federal and state racial classifications to be
the same)
26. 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13, 2117.
27. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90
MICH. L. REV. 213, 238-40 (1991). But see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceof
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067-72 (1980) (criticizing
proponents of separating "process" (e.g., racial classifications) from substantive
principles (e.g., fundamental rights), and suggesting that a meaningful discussion of
the former necessarily entails treatment of the latter).
It is possible that Korematsu will be reinterpreted in the future for positive uses
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elaborated on the possible distinction, but the contraction of the
scope of Korematsu may lead to an expansion of Brown in offering
protection to racial minorities.
The only discussions of Korematsu prior to Adarand that merit
attention appeared in a challenge to the death penalty based on
racial disparities in its imposition and in an immigration case. The
former challenge presents a clear contrast to Adarand, while the latter
challenge suggests that the Court may overlook the general relevance of Korenatsubeyond cases involving racial classifications.
28
In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court rejected a challenge to the
death penalty that was based on strong statistical evidence that
Black defendants accused of murdering White victims were subjected to capital punishment at much higher rates than Black
defendants accused of the same crime against Black victims. In
making his equal protection claim, McCleskey presented the Court
with a multiple regression analysis-the "Baldus study"--that controlled for over 230 nonracial, possibly relevant factors; race was still
the best predictor of death sentencing, other factors being equal.2
The Court stated that instead of empirical evidence of systemic
discrimination, it would require individualized showings that there
had been bias in specific cases? °
In reaching this conclusion, the Court depended in part on
Korematsu. The Court expressed concern that the history of the
country and its changing demographics would make it too easy for
other non-Black minority groups and even Whites to claim racism.31
The Court cited a lengthy list of its own decisions, among them
32
Korematsu, as examples of racism.
In contrast, in Reno v. Flores3", which upheld the Immigration
and Naturalization Service's detention procedures for juveniles
suspected of being deportable, Justice John Paul Stevens implicitly
condemned Korematsu in his dissent. He wrote, "[tihe Court today
does not cite [Korematsu], but the Court's holding in Korematsu obviously supports the majority's analysis in [Flores], for the Court
approved a serious infringement of individual liberty without reas a due process decision, rather than an equal protection decision, at both federal and
state levels, thanks to the consistency valued in Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13, 2117.
28. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The leading law review articles discussing McCleskey,
which also consider Korematsu, are: Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be
Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420 (1988) and Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race,
Capital Punishment,and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988).
29. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287-88; Carter, supra note 28, at 441; Kennedy, supra
note 28, at 1397.
30. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292-93.
31. Id. at 316-17.
32. Id. at 319 n.39.
33 113 S.Ct. 1439 (1993).
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quiring a case-by-case determination as to whether such an
infringement was in fact necessary ....
Justice Stevens would cast Korematsu as a due process decision
rather than a equal protection decision. By his view, repudiating
Korematsu would seem to compel individual analysis rather than
group treatment in a much broader range of government actions, at
least insofar as administrative and individual determinations are
being made. Meanwhile, the orthodox reading of Korematsu has been
as a case concerned with "fit." By this view, racial classifications
are not per se invalid. Whether a racial classification is valid turns
on whether the classification of race "fits" well enough the characteristic for which it serves as a proxy. The legislative lines should be
drawn to avoid egregious overinclusion or underinclusion. The
Court recognizes, realistically, that some over- and underinclusion is
inevitable in the absence of individual determinations, which may
not be feasible.m
With respect to the World War II internment, race supposedly
served as a proxy for disloyalty, i.e., to be Japanese American was to
be disloyal. The inquiry was whether race was an accurate measure
of loyalty. The risks were overinclusion in the form of imprisoning
too many Japanese Americans who were loyal, and underinclusion
in the form of imposing the same restraints on too few other
Americans who were disloyal. To the extent that later citations of
Korematsu were meaningful uses of legal precedent, they carried on

34. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1469 n.30 (1993).
35. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (discussing "a definite and close relationship"
between the ends and the means of governmental action that relies on race); see also
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341 (1949) (explicating "fit" theory); Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and
Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447 (1989) (extending "fit" theory).
The other classic law review article on the internment is Eugene V. Rostow, The
JapaneseAmerican Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
For other evaluations of Korematsu, see Klarman, supra note 27, at 238-40
(comparing Brown v. Boardof Education and Korematsu); Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial
Function and the Elusive Goal of PrincipledDecisionmaking, 1991 WIs. L. REV. 837, 841-44
(discussing the use of Korematsu by the lower federal courts); Neil Gotanda, "Other
Non-Whites" in American Legal History: A Review of JUSTICE AT WAR, 85 COLUMv L.
REV. 1186 (1985) (book review); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (comparing internment
reparations and affirmative action); Arval A. Morris, Justice, War, and the JapaneseAmerican Evacuation and Internment, 59 WASH. L. REV. 843 (1984) (reviewing PETER
IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983)). For recent legal scholarship on equal protection, see
Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
36. The use of individual determinations presumably remains problematic if only
some persons are subjected to them and if these persons are selected on the basis of a
suspect classification.
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the tradition of analyzing "fit" as a matter of overinclusion and
underinclusion. In this abstract form, the Korematsu case has become
an integral anomaly in constitutional law. Beneath the surface for
half a century, the case has appeared once again, this time in the
affirmative action context.
ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA

Last year, the Supreme Court addressed affirmative action in a
decision that appears more definitive than any of its predecessors.
The plaintiff in the suit, Adarand Constructors, Inc., sought to bid
on federal government contracts, the regulations for which included
set-asides for socially and economically disadvantaged businesses. 37
Racial minority status, which was defined for the purposes of this
program as including African Americans, Asian Americans, Latinos,
Native Americans, and others, but excluding Whites, created a
presumption of disadvantaged status for purposes of benefiting
from the set-aside.3
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for five of the nine
members of the Court, ruled in favor of Adarand. The Court held
that affirmative action would be treated like other racial
classifications and thus subjected to "strict scrutiny" analysis.3 The
case was remanded for a determination of whether the set-aside
could meet the "strict scrutiny" standard. 40 Adarand likely will result
in far fewer, but still some, affirmative action programs being
approved by the lower courts. Regardless of the result in Adarand
itself in the lower courts, the approach adopted returns the Court to
the course set in Korematsu.
In order to understand Adarand, it is necessary to consider the
background created by three earlier decisions on affirmative action
during a generation of litigation: Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,41 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 2 and Metro Broadcasting
v. FCC.43 In Bakke, the first affirmative action case decided on the
merits by the Supreme Court, the compromise position proposed by
Justice Lewis Powell turned into the constitutional norm. At issue in
Bakke was the admissions policy of the University of California at

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2101.
Id. at 2103.
Id. at 2111.
Id. at 2118.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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Davis Medical School.4 ' Four Justices voted with Justice Powell to
sustain affirmative action in principle. 4'5 Four different Justices voted
with Justice Powell to strike down the particular affirmative action
plan as it was being implemented. 4 The Powell opinion, as a result
of the deep division among the Justices, became the law that
governed affirmative action. According to Justice Powell, affirmative
action is not exempt from "strict scrutiny,' '47 but neither is
affirmative action subject to "strict scrutiny" in the manner that
Korematsu would prescribe. Without clarifying the exact method of
judicial review, Justice Powell concluded, after a lengthy
consideration of different justifications for affirmative action, that
race could be considered as a factor in university ad-missions
policies if it did not result in numerical quotas. 8
A decade of further political activity, legislative change, and
accompanying litigation returned affirmative action to the Court's
docket again and again. The turning point was marked by a
conservative Court shifting away from the Powell balancing approach in the Croson decision.' 9 The relevant aspect of the Croson
decision, which otherwise foreshadowed the Adarand decision, was
its adoption of a dual standard. At issue in Croson was the set-aside
program enacted by the City of Richmond, Virginia, modeled after
similar federal programs.' The Croson Court held that whatever the
constitutional status of affirmative action programs enacted by
Congress, even identical programs adopted at the state and local
levels would be subject to "strict scrutiny."'' Much of the reasoning
of Croson addressed federalism and the differing roles of federal,
state and local governments, s2 so that the result could not be
explained solely by race.
The distinction between the different acting governmental
entities permitted the Court to distinguish Croson from Metro
Broadcastingv. FCC, the next case it accepted concerning affirmative
action. Metro Broadcastingconcerned the federal program of granting
radio station broadcasting licenses, and awarding "plus" points
53
based on race in order to encourage "diversity" in programming.

44. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269.
45. The four were Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 272.
46. The four were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and
Stevens. Id. at 271.
47. Id. at 290-91.
48. Id. at 315-20.
49. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
50. Id. at 528.
51. Id. at 493-94.
52. See, e.g., id. at 504.
53. Metro Broadcasting,at 556-57.
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Unexpectedly, the Court upheld the program. It reasoned that the
federal government had shown a "nexus" between race and viewpoint; that is, a "nexus" between promoting diversity and increasing
the number of underrepresented minority groups owning broadcast
licenses.-4 That "nexus" served the goal of "diversity" in media
programming.55 Thus, the Court found compelling the "nexus" (the
means) coupled with "diversity" (the ends).
After Metro Broadcasting, Adarand was accepted on the Court's
docket. In resolving the affirmative action controversy at its constitutional limits, the Court made affirmative action much more
difficult, although not impossible.
Korematsu echoes throughout Adarand in the formalist "fit"
analysis of racial classifications. Justice O'Connor asserted that
equal protection standards have always embraced three principles:
(1) "skepticism" toward "any preference" based on racial classifications, (2) "consistency," meaning that the same skepticism
applied regardless of the context of the classification, and (3)
"congruence" in equal protection analysis under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Justice O'Connor applied these principles in deriving three results that bear on earlier cases: (1) "despite
the surface appeal of holding 'benign' racial classifications to a
lower standard [than 'strict scrutiny'] ... 'it may not always be clear
that a so-called preference is . . . benign ...
;57
(2) "all racial classifications . . . must be strictly scrutinized"; and (3) the pronouncement that "we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny"
automatically leads to invalidation of the official use of racial
classifications.9
With each of these statements, Adarand altered Bakke, Croson
and Metro Broadcasting. By equating benign racial classifications
with invidious ones, Adarand effectively overrules Bakke-i.e., the
Powell opinion as well as any part of the other opinions more
favorable to affirmative action. In stating that "strict scrutiny"
applies to all racial classifications, Adarand extended Croson from the
54. Id. at 569, 582-83.
55. Id. at 567-68.
56. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (1995).
57. Id. at 2112.
58. Id. at 2111.
59. Id. at 2117. The interesting issue that remains, and may be addressed in the
current Term, is whether gender classifications will be treated in a formalist manner in
which they are all the same, or in a contextual manner in which discrimination against
women and discrimination in their favor (and paternalistically in their favor) are
distinguished from one another. For an especially interesting view, see Michael M. v.
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (plurality opinion) (arguing that men have
not faced historical discrimination and are not "in need of the special solicitude of the
courts").
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state and local level to the federal level, achieving a consistency with
respect to racial classifications, but not necessarily with conservative
notions of federalism. By explaining that some statutes could
conceivably pass "strict scrutiny," Adarand renders the Metro
Broadcasting analysis superfluous because government entities no
longer need to support affirmative action by making the distinction
that it is helpful rather than harmful; rather they need to support it
by empirical data. Under Adarand, however, the government can
continue to consider race. The judicial branch also participates in the
process as it evaluates whether an affirmative action plan is
supported by sufficient evidence of discrimination and need.
In reaching its holding, the Adarand majority relied heavily on
the Korematsu case. The Court treated Korematsu as analytic support
for its holding as well as a rhetorical example of the dangers of
relying on race to prove other characteristics. In two relatively
lengthy passages, the Court discussed the Korematsu statements setting up the "strict scrutiny" test.60
In the first section, the contemporary Court observed of its
wartime counterpart that "in spite of the 'most rigid scrutiny'
standard it had just set forth, the Court then inexplicably . . .
conclude[d] that.., the racially discriminatory [internment] order
was nonetheless within the Federal Government's power."6'1 The
Court reiterated that the internment was "'motivated largely by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political leadership."' 6 In Adarand, at last, the dissenting Justices in Korematsu
were vindicated. The Adarand majority recognized that the Korematsu
minority had challenged a law that "falls into the ugly abyss of
racism."' 6
In the second section, beyond disapproving the earlier decision,
the Adarand Court continued with its powerful dicta on Korematsu.
After all, Korematsu served a purpose, as a warning against judicial
laxity in reviewing racial classifications. The Court states,
"Korematsu demonstrates vividly that even 'the most rigid scrutiny'
can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial classification.""
And, "[a]ny retreat from the most searching judicial inquiry can only
increase the risk of another such error occurring in the future.""
What is remarkable is the type of judicial inquiry which is required

60. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2106, 2117.
61. Id. at 2106.
62. Id. at 2117 (quoting Civil Liberties Act of 1988 § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102
Stat. 903-04 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (1988))).
63. Id. at 2106 n." (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233).
64. Id. at 2117.
65. Id.
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after Adarand.66
THE RELATIONSHIP OF KOREMATSU AND ADARAND:
STANDING AND SUBSTANCE

The use of the Korematsu decision in the Adarand opinion is
troubling. By simultaneously repudiating discrimination against
Asian Americans and rejecting a remedy for discrimination against
African Americans, it establishes a zero-sum game of sorts, representing an advance for Asian Americans and a retreat for African
Americans. Overall, it is a setback for society at large because the
treatment of racial classifications will serve no stated public policy.
Most obviously, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Adarand
majority represents the first occasion on which the Supreme Court
has disapproved at any length of its own earlier decisions upholding
the constitutionality of the internment. In that respect, the lateness of
the admission is a sign that the judicial branch, as an institution, is
more conservative than the executive and legislative branches; it
confirms that the "least dangerous branch" earns that title by being
the most conservative branch. 7 More importantly, Justice O'Connor
opinion also marks the first occasion on which the high court has
affirmed with substantial discussion its "strict scrutiny" reasoning
for racial classifications. In that respect as well, it shows that the
judiciary is conservative in the sense of limiting itself and other
governmental institutions in remedying racial discrimination.
As much as Asian Americans have emerged politically, the
Korematsu case has made its reappearance doctrinally, in the debate
over affirmative action.6 The Court asserts that the internment and

66. Justice Stevens offers an alternative reading of Korenatsu. Instead of standing
for the proposition that "federal remedial programs are subject to strict scrutiny," he
interprets it as specifying that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racialgroup are immediately suspect." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2125 n.7 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216). In contrast, an
affirmative action program "benefit[s] certain racial groups and impose[s] an indirect
burden on the majority." Id.; cf. id. at 2121 (illustrating the significant differences
between a decision by the majority to impose a special burden on the minority and a
decision to provide benefits to the minority).
In the interest of thoroughness in collating references to Asian Americans,
rather than to read too much into a single reference to them, Justice Stevens also
mentions that a "millionaire" who was "an Asian American or an African American,"
would not benefit from the affirmative action program at issue. Id. at 2129.
67. Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
68. For information on Asian Americans and affirmative action, the following
sources are useful: Viet D. Dinh, Multiracial Affirmative Action, in DEBATING
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACE, GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION

280, 281 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994) (arguing against affirmative action programs which
conceive of race as merit, instead of race as remedy); LEAP ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN
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affirmative action are the same for constitutional purposes. But the
assertion is nothing more than that, an assertion with no analysis
whatsoever.
It may be unintentional, but it should be curious, if not
controversial, that the Court depends on an argument effectively
stating that racial classifications harmful to Asian Americans
weaken racial classifications helpful to African Americans. This
legal rationale is provocative because it parallels the political
argument that affirmative action itself has a disproportionate impact

PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, PERSPECTIVES ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION... AND ITS IMPACT
ON ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS (1995) (collection of essays on the impact of affirmative
action on Asian Americans); DANA Y. TAKAGI, THE RETREAT FROM RACE: ASIANAMERICAN ADMISSIONS AND RACIAL POLITICS (1992) (study of the college admissions
controversy of the 1980s); Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?,
47 STAN. L. REV. 855 (1995) (proposing a framework for analyzing which groupsincluding African Americans, Asian Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, and those
of low socioeconomic status--should be included in a law school's affirmative action
program, based on social science data); Selena Dong, "Too Many Asians": The
Challenge of Fighting DiscriminationAgainst Asian-Americans and PreservingAffirmative
Action, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1995) (discussion of potential claims challenging caps
on Asian Americans at a prestigious public high school in San Francisco); Jerry Kang,
Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of Dworkin's Defense of
Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) (analysis of legal
scholar Ronald Dworkin's defense of affirmative action); Jerry Grace W. Tsuang,
Assuring Equal Access of Asian Americans to Highly Selective Universities, 98 YALE L.J.
659 (1989) (discussing college admissions controversy of the 1980s that involved
upper limit quotas on Asian American admittees); Theodore H. Wang, Swallowing
Bitterness: The Impact of the CalorniaCivil Rights Initiative on Asian Pacific Americans,
1995 ANN. SURV. AM.L. (forthcoming); Frank H. Wu, Neither Black nor White: Asian
Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225 (1995) (comprehensive
legal analysis of issues); Thomas Massey, The Wrong Way to Court Ethnics, WASH.
MONTHLY, May 1986 (arguing against affirmative action for Asian Americans).
For legal analyses of the relationship between Asian Americans and African
Americans, see Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African
American/KoreanAmerican Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles", 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1581 (1993); and Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself":
Deconstructing the Violent DiscourseBetween Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 15 (1993). Cf. Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural
Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven
Multi-Racial Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 870 (1993) (responding to the use of
immigration restrictions as a solution to racial problems, and discussing the need to
deal with interethnic community conflict, as it is exacerbated by hegemonic Euroimmigrationist and cultural assimilationist sentiment).
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on Asian Americans if they are not beneficiaries.6 Yet for the most
part in affirmative action cases, Asian Americans have had a minor
presence. 7°
The earliest case on affirmative action to reach the Supreme
Court, DeFunis v. Odegaard , went unresolved because of mootness
problems but nevertheless mentioned Asian Americans by name.72
In a dissenting opinion, Justice William 0. Douglas-an iconoclastic
liberal who had voted with the majority in Korematsu and defended
his decision in a footnote in DeFunis3 --argued that "there is no
Western State which can claim that it has always treated Japanese
and Chinese in a fair and evenhanded manner."74 Justice Douglas
concluded, though, that these facts weighed against affirmative
action because too many groups might argue that they should be
included. 75
Later, Asian Americans and other non-Black racial minorities
were relegated to the literal margins. In Bakke, Justice Powell stated
in a footnote that the inclusion of "Asians" in the affirmative action
program was "especially curious in light of the substantial numbers of
Asians admitted through the regular admissions process. 76 Justice
Powell cited Korematsu for the traditional recitation of "strict
scrutiny," also noting that arguments of necessity should be balanced, but the standard of review should remain "constant."' The

69. For recent examples of the argument, see Wu, supra note 68, at 225 ("House
Speaker Newt Gingrich... has asserted that 'Asian Americans are facing a very real
danger of being discriminated against' because they are becoming too numerous at
prestigious universities which have affirmative action.... Again and again, claims are
made that Asian Americans, like whites, suffer because of affirmative action for
African Americans."). Cf. Carol Innerst, College Admissions Study Finds AsianAmericans Have a Gripe, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1995, at AS (quoting Congressman
Dana Rohrabacher who argued that Asian Americans are victims of affirmative action
because they "aren't a politically correct minority group"); Benjamin Pimentel, Asian
Americans' Awkward Status: Some Feel Whites Use Them as 'Racial Wedge' with Others,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 22, 1995, at Al (quoting campaign manager of anti-affirmative
action initiative in California as stating, "the quota kings and quota queens seem to be
uncomfortable with the tendency of Asian Americans to emphasize excellence").
70. See Wu, supra note 68, at 259-61. The next few paragraphs are adapted from my
earlier article. Note that Justice Powell was slightly misquoted due to an editing error.

Id. at 257.
71. 416 U.S. 312, 339 n.20 (1974).
72. Id. at 339 n.20 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (mentioning "JapaneseAmericans" and "Americans of Japanese ancestry").
73. Id. at 339 n.20.
74. Id. at 339.

75. Id. at 340.
76. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 n.45 (emphasis added). While the Court explicitly uses
the term "Asians," it seems reasonably likely that the Court also intended to include
Asian Americans. Ed.
77. Id. at 287, 299.
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Justices who voted to uphold affirmative action cited Korematsu with
an awareness that it "paradoxically" supported their position.78
Finally, Asian Americans made a cameo appearance of sorts in
the cases that immediately preceded Adarand. In Croson, Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated with emphasis that in the
Richmond construction industry, "[tihere [was] absolutely no evidence
of past discrimination" against any of the non-Black racial minority
groups, including "Oriental[s]."9 Justice O'Connor understood this
lack of proof as another indication that the affirmative actionplan
"perhaps ... was not in fact to remedy past discrimination' but
only represented self-serving racial spoils."' In Metro Broadcasting,
Justice O'Connor, writing in dissent, apparently alluded to nonBlack racial minority groups by implying that they may be
disfavored by affirmative action in the future: "[m]embers of any
racial or ethnic group, whether now preferred [by the affirmative
action program] or not, may find themselves politically out of
fashion and subject to disadvantageous but 'benign' discrimination."82 She failed to elaborate on her prediction. The Croson Court
cited Korematsu to note that necessity was not an especially
compelling argument in favor of racial classifications.8 The Metro
Broadcasting
Court cited Korematsu for its usual perfunctory
84
purpose.
Arguably, with respect to the actual holding of Metro Broadcasting, there is an equivalence between the conclusion that the racial characteristic of being Japanese American correlates to the
political viewpoint of loyalty to Japan and the conclusion that being
a racial minority radio station owner correlates to a certain cultural
viewpoint in programming content.8 The difference between the
two, however, is that the former imposed imprisonment on a racial
minority group, but the latter confers a benefit on racial minorities.
Standing alone, that difference does not seem enough for either a
principled understanding of racial classifications or a persuasive
political position. In any event, that Metro Broadcasting may have

78. Id. at 359 n.34 (joint opinion by Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 510-11.
82. 497 U.S. at 615 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

83. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501.
84. Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 564 n.12.
85. This conclusion is implied by Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion. See id. at
603-04 (citing Korematsu when arguing that the dangers of racial classifications like the
FCC's affirmative action policy include the endorsement of "race-based reasoning and
the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs").
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been wrongly decided, or poorly reasoned, does not mean that
Adarand was rightly decided, or richly reasoned.
The Court thus arrived at the Adarand decision having consigned Asian Americans to the periphery of racial politics, even as
Korematsu stood as the hollow center of its racial doctrine. The tragedies of the Korematsu case are likely to be replayed by the Adarand
case.
The irony of the Korematsu case, virtually clich6, is that the Supreme Court sanctioned, in the positive as well as negative sense,
the use of race by the government in official decision making. Korematsu and its companion cases on the internment are the only
instances in which invidious .racial classifications have triggered
"strict scrutiny" and survived. The irony of the Adarand case, in
contrast, appears because the Supreme Court, in an effort to state
that some so-called "reverse discrimination" might survive "strict
scrutiny,' * must be understood to have said that some conventional
discrimination could also survive "strict scrutiny."
The reasoning will be apparent to any lawyer attempting to
defend a racial classification that disadvantages people of color. The
reasoning is simplistic, but the potential results are complex and
difficult to predict.
Initially, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand takes a formalistic view of racial classifications. It rejects the suggestion in
Powell's Bakke opinion that affirmative action can be subjected to
anything less than "strict scrutiny," and any vestigial implications
that there are principles for distinguishing between benign and
invidious racial classifications. In the new regime, all racial classifications are equal. None is more or less benign or invidious than
the next.
The Adarand Court then affirms the Korematsu "strict scrutiny"
standard. 87 As Korematsu itself was a case where the racial classification passed this demanding level of judicial review, so too Adarand states plainly that other racial classifications may also meet the
test.88 This dicta overturns generations of unquestioning acceptance
of the fatality of "strict scrutiny."' 9 It presumably means that some
affirmative action programs are permissible by the constitutional
norms. However, thanks to the Adarand approach, affirmative action
has become indistinguishable from any reference to race in the law.

86. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."').
87. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 14, at 8 (characterizing strict scrutiny as "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact").
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Therefore, if affirmative action can be sustained, it follows that
invidious (as they were formerly characterized) classifications can
be sustained.
In other words, the Adarand opinion provides the foundation
for a subsequent case which could follow Korematsu not only in its
reasoning, but also in its result.90The Adarand approach may well be
worse than a color-blind Constitution, which at least has the virtues
of being clear and seemingly neutral, as well as of prohibiting racebased laws detrimental to racial minorities. 91 The Adarand approach
is even weaker than Professor Gunther's approach of rationality
review with "bite."' The Adarand approach is not necessary to a
holding that affirmative action is unconstitutional, but its effect
extends well beyond affirmative action programs.
It may well be true that Justice O'Connor and a majority of the
sitting Supreme Court Justices would recognize a reincarnation of
Korematsu. Indeed, they offer reassurances that they would decide
another Korematsu differently if presented with the opportunity.9
How they should do so remains somewhat a mystery, for if Justice
O'Connor and her colleagues are to be believed, the next Korematsu
will be the same as the next Adarand (and the next Brown v. Board of
Education)-therebeing no distinction to be drawn between racism
and its remedy.
At the very least, to take an example that is quite apt, for the
same reason that the Korematsu case was wrongly decided, internment reparations likewise should be subject to "strict scrutiny"again because racial classifications are the same.9 But after

90. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg, anticipating the risk, appears to be providing
reassurance that a majority of the Justices would strike down a latter-day Korematsu,
however, she provided no further explanation 115 S. Ct. at 2136.
91. The use of empirical data adds some standards to approaches based on
balancing constitutional values. Cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the
Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (arguing that balancing approaches lack
standards).
92. See Gunther, supra note 14, at 20-24.
93. This is not to say that the current Court would be blind to another Korematsu,
but only to question whether it has stated a principle for doing so, other than an "I
know it when I see it" approach. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(containing an acknowledgment by Justice Stewart of his inability to formulate a
coherent test for identifying obscenity). The latter ad hoc approach is suggested by
Justice Ginsburg who, writing for herself and Justice Breyer, indicated that "[the
divisions in this difficult case should not obscure the Court's recognition of the
persistence of racial inequality and a majority's acknowledgment of Congress'
authority to act affirmatively .....
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2135 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
94. Justice Stevens used a similar example: "Now suppose Congress decided to
reward [military] service [by Japanese Americans during World War II] with a federal
program that gave all Japanese-American veterans an extraordinary preference in
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Korematsu was decided in the manner that it was, it became necessary to decide what could be served as a remedy. To say that
Korematsu will be decided differently if it arises again is counterfactual and begs the question of what to do if Korematsu is a given.
Needless to say, internment reparations for Japanese Americans can
9
be easily analogized to affirmative action for African Americans.
The difference between them is the larger scale of the injustice of
slavery, which weighs in favor of providing the latter, but is the very
reason it cannot be compensated-as Justice Brennan stated in
McCleskey, the Court "fear[s] ... too much justice."
The similarities between Korematsu and Adarand are prospective
as well as historical. The Korematsu case established an empirical
standard as much as a normative standard for evaluating race. The
Court in Korematsu accepted that the federal government might
legitimately rely on race as a proxy for political viewpoint, thus
applying different treatment to groups of people rather than
individual persons. The Court in Korematsu ostensibly required that
the federal government provide an empirical basis for doing so. The
question is one of "fit." There are many possible alternative
approaches that can be adopted for a court facing a modern version
of Korematsu, among them, a color-blind Constitution, a prohibition
on subjugation, or a contextual interpretation of racial discrimination."
Instead of considering any of the alternative approaches, the
Adarand case gives further support to an empirical tradition over a
normative tradition." The Court in Adarand, like the Court in the
Government employment." Id. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. See Wu, supra note 68, at 262 n.171.
96. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
rejecting claim of racially discriminatory sentencing); see also Kennedy, supra note 28,
at 1414 (identifying "[aipprehensions over perceived remedial costs" as '"prompt[ing]
the Court increasingly to narrow the definition of violations").
97. See Ruth Colker, Anti-SubordinationAbove All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (advancing equal protection analysis from an
antisubordination perspective, which seeks to eliminate power disparities between the
haves and the have-nots, as opposed to the antidifferentiation perspective, which
contends that treating individuals differently because of their race or sex is
inappropriate).
98. See Charles R. Lawrence, Il1,The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that the intent requirement
in Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence results in the failure to take
into account the effects of unconscious racism).
99. See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact Finding": Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 549-50
(1991) (discussing the Court's uneven use of empirical research, and distinguishing
between normative legal judgment and non-normative scientific findings).
For a concise articulation of "moral" constitutional theory, see Ronald Dworkin,
The Moral Reading of the Constitution,N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 21, 1996, at 46.
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earlier Croson case concerning state and local government versions
of affirmative action, accepted the use of race as a proxy for social
and economic disadvantage, thus allowing preferential treatment for
some members of racial minority groups. The Court in Adarand,
however, would require that the federal government provide an
overwhelming empirical basis in historical fact and contemporary
data, before allowing it to proceed with the challenged program. The
question again is one of "fit." The logical risk is that other racial
classifications will be justified by the same form of statistical
stereotyping.
A few examples of "rational racism" show how Adarand can be
abused. The proportion of Black males with criminal records within
the population of Black males as a whole is higher than the proportion of White males with criminal records out of White males as
a whole (even if the absolute number of White males with criminal
records is greater than the absolute number of Black males similarly
situated, or if less than a majority of Black males have criminal
records). 1°° The proportion of Latinos and Asians who are foreignborn or undocumented immigrants is higher than the proportion of
Caucasian Anglos who are foreign-born or undocumented immigrants. 1
Based on either of these sets of "facts"--which, it would be an
understatement to say, conceal larger issues-federal and state
legislatures might enact discriminatory laws incorporating racial
classifications. A conservative Congress or an electorate voting on a
ballot proposition might believe the arguments °2and accept the public
03
policy proposals advanced in The Bell Curvel and Alien Nation,
which argue, respectively, that race determines intelligence which in
turn, determines socioeconomic success,' °4 and that the nation has
been and should remain racially White and culturally homoge-

100. See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, SENTENCING PROJ., YOUNG BLACK
AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER (1995).
See
generally Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994) (arguing that, in
the context of criminal defendants claiming self-defense based on race-conscious risk
assessment grounded in statistical generalizations, such generalizations subvert the
rationality of the fact-finding process).
101. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION: 1994
(1995).
102. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). The Bell Curve places Asian
Americans nominally at the top of its racial hierarchy; see also Wu, supra note 68, at
271-72 (citing The Bell Curve).
103. PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995).
104. See HERRNSTEiN & MURRAY, supra note 102, at 25, 63-64, 295-315.
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neous.' °5 With enough social science and empirical data, courts
could sustain those laws. Moreover, the courts may be compelled to
sustain those laws because they would lack authority to take an
approach that was more critical or that deviated from legal
ratification of statistical data. The courts are limited by the data.
They cannot serve as vehicles of social change.
If the rationale of Korenatsu, as it has evolved in Adarand, sets
the prevailing constitutional standard-and because constitutional
standards influence and ultimately limit the political discourse-it
becomes acceptable to argue that racism is rational. More than
acceptable, as the "strict scrutiny" standard is weakened and
approaches rationality review, it may well be legally persuasive to
assert that racial classifications are reasonable. The burden may
remain on the defendant to justify the racial classification-that
burden being the difference between "strict scrutiny" and rationality
review-but it is a burden that can be carried. Thus, the Court seems
prepared to accept blithe and uncritical assertions along the lines of
"it can't be racism if it's true."
The Adarand Court offers a reminder that "strict scrutiny" is
nothing more than a standard of review: "It says nothing about the
ultimate validity of any particular law."1°6 By taking an approach
that asks for empirical evidence rather than legal reasoning, the
courts and society avoid the difficult moral judgments about the use
of race that should be addressed at the threshold. The law loses its
mediating moral function if courts cannot decide whether a racial
classification is benign or invidious (though those terms may not be
the best). The discussion of classifications rather than rights elevates
form over substance, an accusation made often, but accurately in
this case.
The Adarand Court confuses the metaphor of "strict scrutiny"
with scientific inquiry, as if the lower courts should actually search
for something physical that will reveal whether discrimination
exists. The popular perception of Adarand exacerbates the problem,
because it is understood as a case condemning only affirmative
action rather than as a case condemning all racial classifications.
What is to be found in Adarand that tempers the disapproval of
affirmative action works little benefit to affirmative action but
considerable gain to other racial classifications.
It would be easier to be sanguine about Adarand if the Court
were willing to consider social science statistics presented by plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination, rather than only in collateral lit-

105. BRRMELOW, supra note 103, at 264-67.

106. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114.
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igation attacking affirmative action.1 0 The Court has refused to do
so. The Court, without reservation about what is at best an inconsistency lacking justification and at worst outright hypocrisy, gave
little weight to empirical data in the McCleskey death penalty case.
Thus, the Court argued in favor of "consistency" in evaluating race
while practicing the contrary. Worse, it used Korematsu in Adarand
and McCleskey to reach results that were diametrically opposed to
one another.
If the Court were to apply McCleskey to Adarand, rigorously
requiring the same evidence to prove discrimination and reverse
discrimination, it would require much more of the allegedly
aggrieved White males. They would need to show that, but for affirmative action, they would have gained admission to the university, been awarded the contract, or been given the promotionthat is, not just that any White male would have benefited, but that
the complainants specifically as individuals would have been chosen-if they wished to obtain broad-based injunctive relief striking
down the program, rather than narrow compensatory relief in the
-form of damages.1 8 That would separate the angry White men from
the unsuccessful White men.' ° It also would emphasize that affirmative action is relatively modest and cannot be blamed for
systemic economic problems. Adding a simple requirement that the

107. It also would be easier to be optimistic if courts were willing to consider
evidence that was not strictly statistical, but critical and interpretative-if the
testimony of the historian or psychologist could supplement the record.
108. In Adarand, there is no indication that the Supreme Court would require the
plaintiff to make this type of showing. Rather, the Court requires the plaintiff to make
the minimal showing that "some time in the relatively near future it will bid on
another government contract." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105 (citing Northeastern Fla.
Contractors v. Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2303-04 (1993)). See generally id. at 2103-05
(describing the affirmative action program at issue and discussing whether plaintiff
has standing to seek declarative and injunctive relief). Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978) (discussing the White plaintiff's burden of
proof to show standing in challenge to school's admission policy).
There are arguments that may distinguish the situations. In particular, there is a
constitutional difference (whether the law is susceptible to a facial challenge) between
covert racism and overt affirmative action. The difference, unfortunately, is taken to
favor the former and disfavor the latter. Therefore, under prevailing doctrine, an
explicit racial reference in the law is distinguished from a law with a racial impact or
with a racial motivation. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105 (distinguishing the present
case, which concerns explicitly race-based classifications, from facially neutral laws
that result in racially disparate impact or are motivated by a racially discriminatory
policy). But only a fool today would openly admit that they were acting to
discriminate against racial minorities. Perhaps the Court will revisit its intent
requirement as government actors with racial motivations become more sophisticated.
109. See Stanley Fish, Reverse Racism or How the Pot Got to Call the Kettle Black,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1993, at 128 (confronting and rebutting the objections to
affirmative action).
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would-be plaintiff show that he was qualified and would have
received the benefit but for affirmative action, might appear to be
inoffensively neutral-for it should foreclose nothing substantively.1 The Court, however, has not followed that course.
In a decision that may have greater significance than Adarand,
the Court two Terms earlier in Northeastern Florida Contractors v.
Jacksonville considered "whether, in order to have standing to
challenge the [affirmative action program], an association of
contractors is required to show that one of its members would have
received a contract absent the [program].""' Justice Clarence
Thomas, commanding the votes of six of his colleagues, wrote in the
lead opinion, "we hold that it is not. 112 justice Thomas reasoned that
the required injury in fact was suffered when the contractor faced a
procedural obstacle in bidding for government contracts, regardless
of whether he was able to demonstrate that without that procedural
113
obstacle the substantive outcome would have been in his favor.
The substantive asymmetry between the internment and
affirmative action (or any negative treatment of racial minorities
compared to remedial programs with a racial component) is reproduced in standing analysis. If the internment and affirmative
action were equivalent for constitutional purposes, it should be
possible for a White plaintiff to sue for the former as well as against
the latter. That is, a White plaintiff could be imagined suing initially
to institute an internment program, or in a collateral challenge to
ensure enforcement in a more stringent manner, much as a racial
minority could challenge racial discrimination, seeking a remedy in
the form of a consent decree or injunction. For that matter, a White
plaintiff also should be able to contest an internment program
directed at racial minorities. These possibilities seem not only mildly
implausible as actual scenarios, but also unclear with respect to
standing. The fact that they are not quite the same for standing

110. Any litigant wishing to challenge an affirmative action program would be able
to satisfy what is a rather minimal standard anyway. Cf. Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (describing plaintiff's burden of
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment employment discrimination as
"not onerous").
111. 113 S. Ct. at 2299. The other issue raised by the case was mootness. Id. at 2301.
The dissenting Justices would have held that the case was moot without reaching the
standing problem. Id. at 2305 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The mootness issue arose
because the affirmative action program was abolished and a new affirmative action
program was instituted after litigation commenced; the difference between the two
was the exclusion of racial minorities other than African Americans. Id. at 2300. The
foundation for Northeastern Florida Contractors was the collateral challenge to
affirmative action permitted by Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
112. 113 S. Ct. at 2299.
113. Id. at 2303.
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purposes suggests that they are substantively dissimilar.
The difference is that the racial minority facing an invidious
racial classification suffers an injury in fact under the more restrictive test, while the White plaintiff challenging affirmative action
suffers a theoretical harm not intended to be directed toward him or
his race."' This difference is emphasized by the standing analysis
followed in NortheasternFlorida Contractorsand Adarand.
The standing analysis in affirmative action, like the substantive
analysis, regards racial classifications in the abstract. But rather than
condemning racial classifications in the abstract, the Court implicitly
accepts the possibility that there will be enough evidence to support
the stereotype. Furthermore, the Court's unwillingness to consider
the reality of racial discrimination that is unconscious or covert,
rather than plainly visible in the explicit intentions of a state actor or
the plain language of a statute, ensures that at the constitutional
level plaintiffs alleging regular discrimination must meet a more
difficult test than plaintiffs alleging reverse discrimination. The only
hope for improvement is that some defendants will prevail in
challenges to affirmative action by demonstrating to the highest
degree that discrimination occurs and that there are no better means
to remedy it. The defendants in those cases, coincidentally, will
often be the very institutions whose conduct gave rise to the need
for a remedy.
A real test of the standing analysis offered by the Court with
respect to affirmative action would be a case brought by a racial
minority whose claim centered around structural obstacles to participating in competition for some type of benefit, that is, whose
claim was based on statistically demonstrated racial discrimination
traceable to official policies. The injury would be concrete, and the
cause would be demonstrable, but the relationship could be more
convoluted than an overt form of substantive racial discrimination.
In other words, the real test of the standing analysis would be
another McCleskey." s Such a case would present a claim that could
be understood as: Whites jurors intentionally discriminate, or White

114. Cf. David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent
Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (1991)
(considering whether one can reconcile a case involving government policy designed
to redress effects of past discrimination with a case involving a facially neutral policy
with disparate impact, on the ground that the two cases involved different kinds of

harm).
115. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); cf. Kennedy, supra note 28, at 142223 (addressing the question of standing and arguing that African Americans are the
victims of racial disparities in death penalty sentencing because their lives are
devalued by the criminal justice system and they are afforded less protection from

crime).
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jurors unconsciously discriminate, or there is a form of systemic bias
in the criminal justice system."6 Whichever it is, one of these
explanations must be true, unless the evidence is regarded as an
artifact or as falsified, contentions that have never been made. The
claim by McCleskey-type plaintiffs should be understood as a claim
of racial discrimination within the official processes, identical to that
raised in Adarand, except in this case the criminal justice system is
implicated rather than the contract bidding system. Of course, the
Court has resolved cases like McCleskey by taking what was merely a
standing issue in affirmative action-and one that turned out to be
nonproblematic at that-and turning it into a dispositive substantive
issue. Under McCleskey, proof of discrimination that is severe and
wrongdoing
widespread is not enough without proof of11 individual
7
intent.
an
and
perpetrator
a
identifies
which
Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that Northeastern Florida
Contractors was correctly decided and portends a positive trend in
standing doctrine. 18 For Professor Sunstein, the standing analysis
should be much more directly linked to the substantive analysis;
indeed, they would merge with one another. He writes, "[t]he
question of standing is the same as the question [of] whether the
plaintiff has a cause of action." 9
The approach espoused by Professor Sunstein has its advantages if it is applied in all instances, and it focuses attention on the
deficiencies of the underlying substantive law. Under this view, the
problem with McCleskey lies with the unwillingness of the Court to
consider statistical evidence, not with anything arising from standing. Professor Sunstein, however, has identified the opposite side of
the problem. Another interpretation, equally consistent and plausible, is that NortheasternFlorida Contractors is problematic because it
has taken what elsewhere has been an issue of substantive law and

116. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 28, at 1405-06 (comparing McCleskey with cases
involving statistical disparities based on racial criteria).
117. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292, 297 (holding that petitioner "must prove that
the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose," and finding
insufficient a study that shows racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty).
A challenge to different sentencing standards for crack and powder cocaine, for
example, would be evaluated under rationality review and almost certainly sustained.
Cf.David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's assumption that equal protection doctrine should
remain uniform regardless of factual context). The problem in popular perception
with the cocaine issue-that the complaining individuals are all "criminals" in some
sense-overlooks the fact that the light sentences in one instance effectively define
away the criminality of the conduct. The conduct might be criminal, but it becomes
more so depending on the race of the perpetrator.
118. See Cass R Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 37, 43, 47-51, 62-63.
119. Id. at 51.
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rendered it a standing issue. The Court indicated that its opinion did
not reach the merits, but by characterizing its concern as one over
standing,2 it effectively resolved what had been in McCleskey a
significant part of the merits (the other part consisting of the facial
discrimination/intentional discrimination threshold requirement).
The Court shifts back and forth between procedure and substance;
in some instances, a particular problem is purely procedural, in
others purely substantive, and in others it is mixed.1 The movement obscures the issues and the inconsistencies-this is to suggest
only that the Court has used procedure inconsistently, not to suggest
that it has done so instrumentally. Forcing McCleskey and NortheasternFlorida Contractors into an Adarand form of congruence leaves
the problem of whether discrimination must be facial or intentional,
but it would be an accomplishment to even expose that problem and
thus address it. The McCleskey claim is exactly the type specified by
Northeastern Florida Contractors: plaintiffs allege "denial of equal
treatment ...not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit."'' 2 It
should make no difference whether in the former case the plaintiffs
seek the benefit of a different sentence, or if they seek to avoid the
sanction of the death penalty; the use of "ultimate" in the latter case
renders the situation all the more poignant. 3
124
However, there is more to the law than naive empircism.
Korematsu, and Adarand after it, depend on procedural means to
accomplish substantive ends. Both cases set the burden of proof
against the government seeking to create a racial classification. In

120. Northeastern Fla. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2301 (1993).
121. Cf. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992)
(analyzing the use of procedure as a surrogate for substance in the immigration law
context, to accomplish progressive changes against the force of the plenary power
doctrine that, in its robust form, would foreclose any judicial review of immigration
policies). See also Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1422 (1995) (arguing that the Court has used standing analysis to mask substantive
results disfavoring racial minorities).
122. 113 S. Ct. at 2303.
123. These tensions have begun to present themselves already. See Reno v. Catholic
Social Services, 113 S. Ct. 2485, 2496 h.19 (1993) (holding that immigrants seeking to
adjust their legal status under IRCA lacked standing or ripe claims, the Court applied
the Northeastern Florida Contractors analysis and defined "injury in fact" as "the
inability to compete on equal footing in the bidding process, not the loss of a contract")
(quoting NortheasternFla. Contractors,113 S. Ct. at 2303).
124. The Court has been ambivalent about the use of expert witness testimony
presenting scientific theories. It rejected the requirement that the theory be "generally
accepted" but also provided trial courts with great discretion to exclude evidence. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 U.S. 2786 (1993). For an excellent
discussion of the problems arising from legal applications of social science, see
Faigman, supra note 99.
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this respect, Korematsu is less sophisticated than Adarand. The
Korematsu case focused on the legal analysis rather than the factual
analysis of whether Japanese Americans were likely to be loyal, and
what scant evidence there was has since been revealed to be false.
Following Korematsu, and more directly Croson, the Adarand test
focuses on the factual analysis as much as the legal analysis of
whether race in the particular industry, locality and time captures
the concept of disadvantage.
The Court's analysis of the "fit" of a racial classification
contains a normative vision of racial justice. Justice Antonin Scalia's
concurring opinion in Adarand, for example, expounds on this
normative vision, which merely is implied in the majority opinion's
discussion of "skepticism," "consistency," and "congruence."1' 5 Justice Scalia wrote forcefully, "[tlo pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the most admirable and benign of purposes-is
to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking
that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. 126 The
alternative view is to become colorblind, at least insofar as official
action is concerned: "In the eyes of government, we are just one race
here. It is American."'12
Whatever the other problems with this normative view, it has
been applied only inconsistently across cases. In Korematsu, the
Court upheld the racial classification disadvantaging Japanese
Americans. In McCleskey, the Court denied the equal protection
claim brought by African Americans. In Adarand, the Court was
"skeptical" about the racial classification that was intended as a
remedy for past and present racial discrimination. In Northeastern
Florida Contractors,the Court resolved what had been a dispositive
substantive issue for a minority plaintiff as a quasi-procedural
standing issue for a White plaintiff. Indeed, if the Court and Justice
Scalia were as insistent about their underlying normative vision of
race in cases brought by racial minority plaintiffs, they should be
much more willing to find racial discrimination rather than attempting to determine if a racial classification "fits" the compelling
governmental interest.
Although in a logical (perfect?) world the outcome of the inquiry should be independent of the party that bears the burden of
proof or the precision of the proof, in a legal (imperfect?) world the
outcome of the litigation may be resolved by declaring which party
bears the burden of proof and at what level. Strangely, the emphasis
on empiricism places data in a vacuum. The "strict scrutiny" stan-

125. See supra note 56.
126. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. Id.
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dard relies on an abstract and formal conception of race, leaving
open the possibility that racial prejudice can be reasonable, but
foreclosing the potential to develop a response. According to the
Supreme Court interpretation of race, Korematsu and Adarand are the
same: negative racial classifications are prohibited only because
positive racial classifications are prohibited. By a more realistic
understanding of race, Korematsu and Adarand are not identical; they
are mirror images with antithetical features. It may well be moot as a
political matter, but it is important to affirm again as a constitutional
matter that there can be a principled basis for distinguishing
between racial discrimination and affirmative action.
While there may be legitimate criticisms of affirmative action,
among them characterizations of some of the programs in practice as
being little more than racial preferences, and constitutional tensions
along with moral unease over the principles, the Court invites cynicism and loss of respect by simply equating conventional racism
with efforts to remedy it. Only if Adarand proves to be as helpful for
racial minorities, and especially African Americans, to prove claims
of racism, as it does for Whites to assert claims of reverse racism,
will it live up to its task. Whatever one might believe about race and
racism, the history of slavery, official segregation, Jim Crow, antimiscegenation laws, restrictionist immigration policies, the Japanese
American internment, and their contemporary effects, all should not
be reduced to the debate over the validity of affirmative action.
CONCLUSION
For Asian Americans as a political group, the Korematsu and
Adarand cases taken together should serve as a reminder that any
racial classification should be seen with ambivalence. It could be
helpful as well as hurtful to Asian Americans, and possibly both
simultaneously. For Americans as a whole, the cases should show
that racial classifications are not simple nor should they be simply
condemned. Race is a complex social phenomenon. Racial classifications are a complicated legal phenomenon. The realities of race
should be recognized and considered, regardless of whether as a
constitutional matter government color blindness is required universally or government color consciousness is tolerated in certain
cases. Race deserves deeper consideration than it has been given by
the Supreme Court.

